Faculty, staff and students at Stanford will likely, at one time or another, intersect with federal regulations that impose access, dissemination or participation restrictions on the transfer of items and information regulated for reasons of national security, foreign policy, anti-terrorism or non-proliferation. In these situations, the Stanford community is dealing with US export control regulations.
US export controls exist to protect the national security and foreign policy interests of this country. Export controls govern the shipment, transmission, or transfer of regulated items, information and software to foreign countries, persons or entities.
University awareness of export control laws and requirements are critical in a post-9/11 world: there are now significant civil and criminal penalties for violations of these regulations. Enforcement actions have recently been brought against several academic institutions, with resulting convictions. That said, the conduct and results of fundamental research are generally excluded from federal "deemed export" controls (for example, disclosure of information to foreign nationals on U.S. soil) in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 189.
When they do apply, export controls can impose access, dissemination, and participation restrictions on the conduct of Stanford research. And when they do apply, they apply to ALL Stanford activities, not just sponsored research. Export control regulations are complex and constantly evolving -- for example, they include technical terms of art; "exports" are not just items sent out of the country by the USPS, FedEx, UPS or another freight forwarder, but include international handcarries of items (laptops, cell phones, biologicals) as personal baggage or sharing certain regulated technical information or software code domestically. For this reason, the Dean of Research Office has created a "Definitions" page (see "In This Section" to the right) introducing common export control terms and concepts, in easy-to-understand terms, to make export control regulations accessible to the Stanford community.
Stanford relies on proper documentation in order to make use of exclusions and exemptions from licensing requirements. Recordkeeping is important if you are involved in research efforts where it may be necessary to ship research articles outside the U.S. or share export-controlled information provided by third parties, such as vendors, subcontractors, or collaborators.
What Do Export Controls Usually Cover?
When export controls apply, they are frequently, but not exclusively, associated with items, information, and software code within the following general areas:
- Chemical, Biotechnology, and Biomedical Engineering
- Materials Technology
- Remote Sensing, Imaging, and Reconnaissance
- Navigation, Avionics, and Flight Control
- Propulsion System and Unmanned Air Vehicle Subsystems
- Nuclear Technology
- Sensors and Sensor Technology
- Advanced Computer/Microelectronic Technology
- Information Security/Encryption
- Laser and Directed Energy Systems
- Rocket Systems
- Marine Technology
Federal Agencies and their Export Control Regulations
The Federal agencies and their export control regulations most commonly associated with research activity at academic institutions in the US are the following:
US Department of State (Directorate of Defense Trade Controls)
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) governs "defense articles and services" (items and information specifically designed or adapted for military use (includes satellites and spacecraft). The State Department also provides guidance on defense services and fundamental space science research.
US Department of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and Security)
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) govern dual use items and information predominately civilian in character by having military applications.
US Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control)
The Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations (OFAC) administers and enforces trade embargoes and economic sanctions. For reference, see their Lists of Sanctioned Countries and Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under the "Resources" tab on the OFAC website.
Violations of these export control regulations can lead to significant civil and criminal penalties.
Stanford Policy Guidance
Stanford's Openness in Research Policy expresses our institutional commitment to "the principle of freedom of access by all interested persons to the underlying data, to the processes, and to the final results of research." Preserving a culture of openness is a fundamental tenet of Stanford research. Stanford has codified its commitment to openness and non-discrimination, consistent with compliance with US export control laws and regulations, in several of its research policies:
- Export Controls policy (RPH)
- Openness in Research policy (RPH)
- Faculty Policy on Conflict of Interest (RPH)
- Nondiscrimination in Research Agreements (RPH)
Stanford University has prepared policy guidance and communication to faculty and staff on this subject. Here are some important university communications:
- Memorandum on Relationships with Entities Identified as Presenting Elevated Export Control or Information Security Risks - Memo from Ann Arvin, Vice Provost and Dean of Research (March 2016)
- Travel to US Sanctioned Countries (Iran, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, North Korea and the Crimean Region of the Ukraine) - Memo from Ann Arvin, Vice Provost and Dean of Research (Created July 2015, updated May 2016)
- Export Controls Compliance and International Shipments - Memo from Ann Arvin, Vice Provost and Dean of Research (June 2013)
- Documentation Requirements for Export Controls - Memo from Ann Arvin, Vice Provost and Dean of Research (April 2009)
- Reminder - Export Control Requirements - Memo from Ann Arvin, Vice Provost and Dean of Research (March 2007)
Federal Policy Guidance
In addition, the following information is of critical importance to U.S. higher education:
- National Security Decision Directive 189 (Establishes "fundamental research exclusion"), September 1, 1985
- Reaffirmation of NSDD 189 by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, November 1, 2001
- Memorandum on Fundamental Research from Ashton Carter, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, May 4, 2010